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This paper presents a general equilibrium currency crisis model of the ￿third
generation￿, in which the possibility of currency crises is driven by the in-
terplay between private ￿rms￿ credit-constraints and nominal price rigidities.
Despite our emphasis on microfoundations, the model remains suﬃciently
simple that the policy analysis can be conducted graphically. The analysis
hinges on four main features: i) ex post deviations from purchasing power
parity; ii) credit constraints a la Bernanke-Gertler; iii) foreign currency bor-
rowing by domestic ￿rms; iv) a competitive banking sector lending to ￿rms
and holding reserves and a monetary policy conducted either through open
market operations or short-term lending facilities. We ￿rst show that with
a positive likelihood of a currency crisis, ￿rms may indeed ￿nd it optimal
to borrow in foreign currency, following Chamon (2001). Second, we derive
suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a sunspot equilibrium with currency
crises. Third, we show that a reduction in the monetary base through re-
strictive open market operations is more likely to eliminate the possibility of
currency crises if at the same time the central bank does not impose excessive
constraints on short-term lending facilities.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Researchers in recent years have had to grapple with the puzzle of how fast-
growing economies with large export surpluses and substantial government
surpluses, could end up in the space of months, in a deep and damaging
currency crisis. This paper builds on a very simple story of why things fall
apart quite so dramatically: if domestic prices do not adjust fully to exchange
rate changes in the short run, a currency depreciation leads to an increase
in the debt burden of domestic ￿rms that borrowed in foreign currency, and
consequently a fall in pro￿ts.1 Since lower pro￿ts reduce net worth, this may
result in reduced investment by credit-constrained ￿rms, and therefore in a
lower level of economic activity in the following period. This, in turn, will
bring a fall in the demand for money, and thus a currency depreciation in
that next period. But arbitrage in the foreign exchange market then implies
that the currency must depreciate in the current period as well. Hence the
possibility of multiple short run equilibria in the market for foreign exchange.
A currency crisis occurs when an expectational shock pushes the economy
into the ￿bad￿ equilibrium with low output and a high nominal exchange
rate.
This story is compelling for a number of reasons. First, there is evidence
that foreign currency exposure is correlated with the likelihood of a crisis:
in particular, Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (2000) show that the coun-
tries most likely to go into a crisis were those in which ￿rms held a lot of
foreign currency denominated debt.2 Second, there is strong evidence that
exchange rate changes are incorporated into domestic prices relatively slowly.
For example, Goldfajn and Werlang (2000) compute the pass-through from
exchange rate to prices in a set of 71 countries including both developed and
less developed countries. They show that the pass-through is very gradual
and tends to be even smaller after currency crises￿in the Asian crises, for
example, less than 20% of currency depreciation was re￿e c t e di ni n ￿ation
after 12 months. Third, it is widely accepted that an important link between
1The damaging impact of foreign currency debt is often mentioned in the context of
currency crises. See, for example, Cooper (1971), Calvo (1998) and Mishkin (1996, 1999).
While the role of foreign currency public debt has received some attention in the theoretical
literature on crises (e.g. Bohn, 1990, Obstfeld, 1994, Falcetti and Missale, 1999), the
impact of private foreign currency debt has hardly been analyzed (see, however, Jeanne,
2000a).
2See also Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) for the Finnish case.
1the currency crises and the subsequent fall in output was a ￿nancial crisis
which aﬀected the ability of private ￿rms to ￿nance production￿indeed this
is why the crises are often described as triple (currency, ￿nancial, output...)
crises.3 Fourth, the model predicts that such crises are most likely to occur in
economies at an intermediate level of ￿nancial development (i.e., not in the
US and not in Burma) and cannot be ruled out by what are conventionally
viewed as prudent government policies, which in turn seems consistent with
the facts.
This is not the ￿rst paper to tell a story of this kind. Our earlier pa-
pers on the subject (Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2000a, 2000b) feature
the same basic story, as does the related paper by Krugman (1999b). Yet,
our paper is an attempt to delve deeper into the story, with two main ad-
ditions to the existing literature. First, the modeling of the credit market
imperfection is being enriched so that both the volume of lending and the
currency composition of debt become endogenous. This allows us to show the
existence of an equilibrium where domestic entrepreneurs borrow in foreign
currency, despite the fact that it makes the whole economy more vulnerable
to currency crises. We thus depart from the view that it is the presence
of government guarantees that leads countries to be overexposed to foreign
currency risk and thereby to crises, with the implication that removing those
guarantees would automatically solve the problem.4 Our results suggest in-
s t e a dt h a to v e r e x p o s u r em a yb eb u i l ti n t ot h ev e r yn a t u r eo ft h ec o n t r a c t i n g
environment.
The second addition of this paper is to integrate the monetary side of the
economy together with its credit side, through the natural channel of mod-
eling the needs of the banking sector for reserves. This is important because
the role of monetary policy in a crisis depends crucially on how monetary
policy aﬀects ￿rms￿ access to credit.5 Integrating money and credit, in turn
3Most attempts to make sense of the crises have been based on the idea that a crisis
aﬀects output through its eﬀect on access to credit in the ￿rm sector. See for example,
Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (1999a,b) Krugman (1999a), Chang and Velasco (1999),
Caballero and Krishnamurty (2000). The key diﬀerence between these papers and the
current paper is these are real models, whereas we stress the monetary elements in the
story.
4See Krugman (1999a), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2000) and Schneider and
Tornell (2000) for versions of this argument.
5In our previous two papers monetary policy could only have any real eﬀects through
changes in the real exchange rate. In Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000a) we intro-
duced such a real eﬀect by directly assuming that a tighter monetary policy raises the real
2generates useful predictions about the mix of monetary policy instruments.
In particular, an important conclusion from our analysis is that it may be
counterproductive for monetary authorities to be excessively tight with re-
gard to both the monetary base (or the open market policy) and the lending
facilities to banks (e.g., through the so-called discount window), if the objec-
tive is to stabilize the economy and avoid the occurrence of a currency crisis.
Whenever a reduction of the monetary base appears to be the adequate pol-
icy to follow, it will be all the more appropriate if it is accompanied by a
discount window policy which is not too tough.
There are a number of other recent papers which have studied the issue
of monetary policy in related contexts. Apart from our own previous papers
already mentioned above, the most closely related literature includes Gertler,
Gilchrist and Natalucci (2000), Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2000) and
Christiano, Gust and Roldos (2000). All of these papers share the conclusion
t h a te v e ni nac r i s i si tm a yb eag o o di d e at ol e tt h ee x c h a n g er a t eg od o w n
further. Gertler et al. and Cespedes et al. interpret this result as supporting
t h ec a s ef o r￿exible exchange rates over ￿xed exchange rates, while Christiano
et al. see it as a case for relaxing monetary controls in a crisis even at the
cost of an exchange rate depreciation. The one important diﬀerence between
these papers and ours is that they operate in an environment where there is
a unique equilibrium. In Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2000b) we had
shown that there are circumstances where the equilibrium is always unique
and in such cases, the case for taking a relaxed monetary stance and letting
the exchange rate ￿oat down is much stronger, consistent with the message
of these papers. In contrast, our analysis in this paper focuses exclusively on
the multiple equilibrium case.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the general frame-
work, including the borrowing and investment decisions of domestic manu-
facturing ￿rms. It also endogenizes the credit constraints and the currency
composition of ￿rms￿ debt. Deviations from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
are caused by preset prices. Section 3 describes the monetary side of the econ-
omy; in particular, it derives the demand for reserves by banks in relation
to the supply of credit to domestic manufacturing ￿rms, thereby generating
a reserves market equilibrium equation. Together with interest parity, this
costs of lending, which in turn would lead to the conclusion that a tight monetary policy
might not always be a good thing. Here, instead, the assumed eﬀect of monetary policy
on the real cost of lending is generated from a model where the lending banks optimally
choose their cash holdings.
3equation determines a relationship from future expected output to current
nominal exchange rate which we refer to as the ￿IPLM￿ (or ￿interest-parity-
LM￿) curve. Section 4 concentrates on the real side of the economy, which
leads to expressing future output as a function of the current nominal ex-
change rate; we refer to this second relationship between those two variables,
as the ￿W￿ (or ￿wealth￿) curve. Section 5 analyzes the sunspot equilibria of
this model; in particular it provides suﬃcient conditions for the existence of
non-deterministic sunspot equilibria, and thus for the occurrence of expecta-
tional shocks and the possibility of currency crises. Section 6 uses a simple
graphical representation of the model to discuss the stabilization eﬀects of
open market operations and of discount window-types of policies. Finally,
Section 7 concludes by suggesting various potential extensions.
2 General Framework
We consider an in￿nite-horizon, small, open, monetary economy with two
production sectors, an import-competing manufacturing and an exporting
commodity sector. There are four types of agents in the economy: entrepre-
neurs who produce manufacturing goods; non-entrepreneurs who can either
work for the manufacturing sector at a preset wage, or work on their own to
produce commodities according to a linear one-for-one technology; commer-
cial banks that lend to the entrepreneurs and hold reserves; and the central
bank that runs monetary policy with open market operations or short-term
lending facilities.
Entrepreneurs in the manufacturing sector produce diﬀerentiated goods,
but in a symmetric fashion with the same production function and the same
inverse demand function. In addition, all manufacturing ￿rms share the
following two characteristics: First, they preset prices for each period before
the actual exchange rate is known; to save on menu costs they maintain the
price ￿xed for the entire period. Second, they borrow from banks, but the
credit contract is only partially enforceable, which generates a constraint on
how much the ￿rm can borrow. Finally, we shall restrict attention to the case
where the domestic demand for manufacturing goods is always larger than
their domestic production. We assume that for each manufacturing good
there are international producers who are ready to sell it in the domestic
market. Thus, changes in demand are accommodated by foreign producers
who act as a competitive fringe and sell at a constant price equal to one unit
4of the foreign currency.
An unexpected currency depreciation has a negative aggregate impact
on output in our model through an increase in the foreign currency debt
burden. Although exporters gain from the depreciation, it is the import-
competing sector that determines the dynamics of output. The model could
be extended by introducing stronger competitiveness eﬀects, for example
with an exporting sector that has characteristics similar to the importing-
competing. In that case, there would be a trade-oﬀbetween a competitiveness
eﬀect and a foreign currency debt eﬀect. Since the competitiveness eﬀects are
well understood, we do not incorporate this aspect in our model and focus
on foreign currency debt.
At the heart of the theoretical model is the possibility of multiple expecta-
tional equilibria. In other words, a ￿sunspot￿ is realized, causing expectations
to shift during the period. Since prices cannot move within the entire period,
this expectational shock will have to be absorbed by the nominal exchange
rate, which explains why it has output eﬀects and can be self-con￿rming.
It is convenient to focus on the case where this expectation shift can only
occur in the ￿rst period. To ensure this, we assume that the productivity
in all but the ￿rst period is so high that there is only one possible equilib-
rium. We then allow the productivity in period 1 to vary. We then show
that when the productivity is low enough, there will be a non-degenerate
sunspot equilibrium in which the equilibrium exchange rate in period 1, S1,
is randomly distributed and equal to a low value S0
1 with probability 1 − q
and to a high value S00
1 with probability q,w i t hS00
1 >S 0
1 and q being small.
W h e nt h ee x c h a n g er a t et a k e st h eh i g hv a l u eS00
1, manufacturing output is
low and ￿rms are unable to meet their debt obligations. We shall refer to
this state of nature as a currency crisis.
Purchasing power parity (PPP) will be assumed to hold ex ante at the
beginning of every period, and the only deviation from PPP ex post will be
in period 1 in the manufacturing sector as a result of the expectational shock
not being accommodated at once by domestic price-setting in that sector.
2.1 Sequence of Events
The timing of events can be summarized as follows. Manufacturing prices
are ￿xed at the beginning of each period t for the entire period. At the end of
the period, manufacturing ￿rms￿ earnings are determined. The productivity
for the next period is also determined at this time. The expectational shock
5occurs, to which corresponds a realization of the nominal exchange rate St.
The shock is accompanied by an adjustment in the nominal interest rate it
on domestic bonds, which is in￿uenced by the monetary policy set by the
central bank and by the demand for reserves (ht)f r o mc o m m e r c i a lb a n k s .
This in turn will aﬀect the lending rate il
t charged by banks to ￿rms in period
t +1 . The entrepreneur now decides whether or not to repay its debt from
the previous period and then chooses the fraction βt of his net earnings that
he will save. With these savings wt, ￿rms decide how much to borrow for the
subsequent period (lt+1) and how much to invest (wt+1 +lt+1). We will focus
on the case where expectational shocks on the nominal exchange rate St only
occur in the ￿rst period and where there is a unique equilibrium exchange
rate in all subsequent periods.
2.2 Production Technology
All manufacturing ￿rms produce according to the same Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology yt = Atkα
t n
1−α
t , where nt and kt denote respectively the labor and
capital inputs in period t. kt is working capital made of manufactured goods
that fully depreciates at the end of the period. Since labor supply to manu-
facturing ￿rms is perfectly elastic at real wage ω, in equilibrium we have:







Note also that sales net of wage payments are αyt,a st h eo p t i m a ld e m a n d
for labor gives ωnt =( 1− α)yt. We will focus on the case where At ≡ A
(and therefore σt ≡ σ) for t ≥ 2, with σ suﬃciently larger than σ1 so that
expectational shocks and multiple sunspot equilibria can occur in period 1,
but there is a unique deterministic equilibrium in all subsequent periods.
2.3 Savings and Consumption Behavior
All individuals in the domestic economy, including the domestic entrepre-







s.t. wj+1 = Mjwj − cj
where cj is an aggregate consumption index for manufactured goods and wj+1
i st h ee n t r e p r e n e u r ￿ ss a v i n g s .I fw ea s s u m et h a tU(ct)=l nct,A p p e n d i xA
shows that entrepreneurs consume a constant fraction 1 − β of their return,
that is: ct =( 1− β)Mtwt for all t. This implies that the dynamic evolution
of entrepreneurs￿ wealth is given by:
wt+1 = βMtwt
Now, within each period t, the consumption index ct results from an intra-











where ct(i) is the individual consumption of manufactured good i in period t
and ν is the elasticity of substitution between any two manufacturing goods,
which in turn must be larger than one. A consumer￿s total nominal con-
sumption at date t is: Z 1
0
pt(i)ct(i)di = Ψt (2)
where Ψt represents total nominal expenditures and pt(i) is the price of good
i at time t.













6They could also derive utility from the homogenous commodity, but we assume, with-
out loss of generality, that their optimal consumption is equal to zero. Entrepreneurs may
also incur some disutility or some private bene￿ts from producing, but this has no bearing
on the analysis insofar as the corresponding cost or bene￿ti s￿xed.
72.4 Price Setting
While PPP holds at any time for commodities and ex ante for all goods, it
does not hold ex post in period 1 in the manufacturing good sector.7 This
follows, ￿rst from the assumption that the price of manufacturing goods is
preset in domestic currency for one period to save on menu costs8;a n d ,s e c -
ond, from the assumption that consumers cannot arbitrage ex post between
domestic and foreign producers. Arbitrage (within an industry) is possible
ex ante, so that PPP holds ex ante for all manufacturing goods.
We shall restrict attention to the case where ct(i) >y t(i) for all (t,i), so
that the manufacturing sector is always import competing and for each good
i there is a domestic producer and a set of foreign producers. We assume that
consumers ￿r s tp r e c o m m i to naq u a n t i t ya n dap r i c ew i t hd o m e s t i cp r o d u c -
ers. Then, risk-neutral foreign producers compete Bertrand on the residual
market segment and set the price in domestic currency.9 If we normalize
their marginal cost (in foreign currency) to 1, their price is Se
t. The domestic
producer has to set the same price to attract consumers (ex ante arbitrage)
and sell them the quantity determined by their credit constraint. Thus, we
simply have pt(i) ≡ Pt ≡ Se
t. Finally, since the quantity sold by domestic
producers is pre-determined, changes in manufacturing goods demand are
entirely met by changes in imports, with foreign producers always ready to
satisfy domestic demand at the preset price Pt.
While manufacturing prices are sticky, the domestic currency price of
commodities is assumed to be ￿exible in any period t and simply equal to
Stω,w h e r eω denotes the foreign currency commodity price which we take
to be constant and equal to ω. If non-entrepreneurs choose to devote one
unit of labor to produce one unit of commodity which they sell on the world
markets, they get Se
tω = Ptω. Thus, they will work in the manufacturing
sector if the real wage oﬀered by domestic entrepreneurs is at least equal to
ω.
7E.g., see Dornbusch (1988) for the diﬀerence between commodities and manufactured
goods.
8This is the typical assumption made in the ￿new open economy macroeconomics￿ liter-
ature. See for example Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995, 1996) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2000). Alternatively, in Butters (1977) or Prescott (1975) price-rigidity results from in-
formational asymmetries and search costs.
9The strategy of pricing to market in domestic currency is taken as given. Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2001) provide conditions under which this strategy is optimal.
82.5 Credit
2.5.1 Interest Parity
The exchange rate is determined by investors arbitrating between domestic
and foreign currency bonds; we assume full capital mobility, so that uncov-







2.5.2 The Debt Contract
A ￿rm￿s capital investment in any period t is made of the entrepreneur￿s
own wealth wt and of additional funds borrowed from a bank lt. Our model
will rely heavily on balance-sheet eﬀects in the spirit of Bernanke-Gertler
(1989), which in our framework shows up as a positive relation between lt and
wt. We now derive some properties of this relationship and other properties
pertaining to the currency composition of debt, based on a model that is an
extension of a model of ex post moral hazard in the credit market that was
￿rst developed by Aghion, Banerjee, and Piketty (1999).
We imagine a world where credit contracts are only partially enforceable.
First, the borrower is protected by limited liability: he always retains at least
af r a c t i o nϕ of his revenue from production in all states, including the ones
where there is involuntary default, i.e., when he does not have enough money
to pay. This is the amount he can simply divert in a way that no one can
￿nd it afterwards.
Second, the borrower has the option of voluntary default on any speci￿c
loan even if he has the money to repay. In other words, he can refuse to
repay the loan. When this happens the lender can collect any collateral that
the borrower has pledged to him in lieu of the interest payment.11 However
we assume that future output from production cannot be pledged: The bor-
rower can always hide the proceeds from production, though in the process a
fraction τ is lost. However the lender can still try to get his money back by
putting eﬀort into debt collection. Speci￿cally, by incurring a nonmonetary
10The uncovered interest parity applies with risk neutrality as it is the outcome of
arbitrage from fully diversi￿ed international investors.
11This distinction between secured and non-secured loans will play an important role in
Appendix B where we derive suﬃcient conditions under which it is (weakly) optimal for
domestic ￿rms to borrow entirely in foreign currency.
9eﬀort cost l.C(ψ), where C(ψ)=−cln(1 − ψ) and l is the size of the loan,
the lender can appropriate a fraction ψ of his due repayment (as long as the
borrower has the money).
Finally, lenders do not have exclusive contracts. In particular, the ￿rst
lender the borrower borrows from cannot automatically make the terms of
the loan contract contingent on subsequent credit transactions. One reason
this may be the case is that the second lender and the borrower could have
the joint incentive to conceal the transaction, because they are both made
better oﬀ by it. This implies that a ￿rst lender does not know the actual
currency exposure of a ￿rm. Moreover, the loans do not have predetermined
seniority￿when the borrower defaults, either voluntarily or involuntarily,
the lenders bargain over the division of the costs of debt collection and the
amount recovered from the borrower. We assume that lenders are repaid in
proportion to the amount they are owed.
These three assumptions together determine the structure of the loan
contract in equilibrium. This is what we investigate in the rest of this sub-
section.
The credit multiplier Consider ￿rst the strategic default decision on a
loan that is invested in production. The entrepreneurs￿ real income after
wage and debt repayment in a particular state of the world is αyt+1−Rtlt+1,
where Rtlt+1 is his real interest rate obligation in that state of the world. He
will not choose strategic default in period t +1if and only if:
αyt+1 − Rtlt+1 ≥ α(1 − τ)yt+1 − ψRtlt+1, 12 (4)
or




Now, turning to the choice of the optimal monitoring policy ψ, the lender
will choose ψ to maximize:
ψRt + cln(1 − ψ),
so his optimal choice of ψ is given by the ￿rst order condition:
(1 − ψ)Rt = c.
12T h eL H S( r e s p . R H S )i st h eb o r r o w e r ￿ sn e tr e v e n u ei fh er e p a y s( r e s p . i fh er e f u s e s
to repay) his debt. The RHS assumes that the borrower does hide the proceeds from
production.







This gives us a relation between the borrower￿s predicted future income and
the amount he can borrow on the strength of it. To see how this translates
into a borrowing constraint we make use of the fact that the loan is invested







Notice that in this case, ￿t depends only on σt+1 and since σt+1 is known
when the loan is given, ￿t is independent of what happens within the period.
As a result, a borrower who is lent more than ￿twt will strategically default in
every state of the world where he has anything to repay (what he does when
he has nothing is irrelevant). We now assume that c is so large that the
lender would never consider lending to a borrower who is planning to refuse
to repay. Therefore a borrower who is planning to invest only in production
will be lent at most ￿twt.
Consider next the decision faced by a borrower who borrows an amount
Bt+1 and invests it in a pledgeable asset (say a government bond) that is then
pledged against the loan. Suppose that in a particular state of the world, the
income from the asset is zt+1 and the corresponding interest rate obligations
are RtBt+1.If the borrower repays, his net income from this transaction will
be zt+1 −Rtlt+1. There is willful default if the borrower defaults despite zt+1
being greater than Rtlt+1. Upon willful default, the lender seizes the whole
income zt+1 (since it is pledged to him) and therefore the borrower ends up
with zero. Willful default is therefore never a good option when the money is
invested in an asset that is pledged against the loan. This in turn implies that
there is no limit on the size Bt+1 of a secured loan. This remark will play an
important role in our analysis of the currency composition of domestic ￿rms￿
loans.
Foreign versus Domestic Currency Borrowing The fact that the ￿rms
borrow in foreign currency will play a crucial role in our analysis. While this
accords well with what we observe in many emerging market economies, it
does require a justi￿cation. In Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2000) or
11Schneider and Tornell (2000), foreign currency borrowing follows from the
assumption that domestic ￿rms are bailed out by the government in case
of default, so that ￿rms will want to increase their risk exposure by bor-
rowing in foreign currency. Jeanne (1999, 2000) develops models in which
foreign currency borrowing serves as a signaling or as a commitment device.
In this paper, foreign currency borrowing follows directly from the extrinsic
exchange rate uncertainty together with the above assumptions on the set of
feasible debt contracts, especially the assumption that the currency compo-
sition of a borrower￿s portfolio is not contractible. The argument is directly
adapted from Chamon (2001)￿we simply generalize his result to allow the
￿rms to be credit constrainted.
Consider an initial situation where there is extrinsic uncertainty on the
nominal exchange rate of the type described in section 3, with the nominal
exchange rate, St+1, being either low (S0
t+1 with probability 1 − q) or so
high (S00
t+1 with small probability q)t h a ta￿rm that has borrowed in foreign
currency will have to default in that state. Assume, as above, that the ￿rm
prices in domestic goods. Then, given the assumption that an individual
lender cannot observe the currency composition of a borrower￿s portfolio, one
can show that for ϕ suﬃciently large, in equilibrium it is (weakly) optimal
for the ￿rm to borrow entirely in foreign currency in order to bene￿tf r o m
limited liability in state S00
t . The proof is detailed in Appendix B, and relies
on the following argument:
Consider a ￿rm that borrows initially from a lender in domestic currency;
since no individual lender can observe the currency composition of her bor-
rower￿s portfolio, this ￿rm has the possibility to expropriate its initial lender
through the following scheme: use the initial loan in domestic currency to
purchase government bonds which the ￿rm then uses as a collateral for a
second -secured- loan B in foreign currency. In case of default ( which in
equilibrium will happen in state S00
t+1) the non-diverted share (1 − ϕ) of
production revenues will be shared pro-rata between the two lenders (each
of them being repaid in proportion to the amount she/he is owed13). The
higher B, the more will the ￿rst lender be expropriated whenever the do-
mestic ￿rm defaults. On the other hand, being secured with a pledgeable
collateral, the second lender will not charge an interest rate which fully in-
corporates the default premium, as the cost of default is essentially borne by
the ￿rst lender whom we assumed to be unsecured. The ￿rm therefore gains
13The amount the secured lender is owed, is net of the collateral seized in case of default.
12in terms of expected payoﬀs by deviating from the strategy of borrowing
only in domestic currency and choosing a high value of B. However it also
takes on more risk in the process. It will prefer to deviate in cases where
t h ei n c r e a s ei np a y o ﬀ dominates the increase in risk, which happens when ϕ
is not too small (increasing ϕ increases the ￿rm￿s default payoﬀ). When it
prefers to deviate in this way, the only possible equilibria have the domestic
￿rm always defaulting in state S00
t+1, and getting the same expected utility as
when it borrows entirely in foreign currency.14
3 The Monetary Sector
3.1 The Demand for Reserves
Domestic banks play a crucial role in this economy since they both channel
credit to ￿rms and hold reserves, and are therefore at the center of the mon-
etary transmission mechanism. There is perfect competition in the banking
sector and banks have a standard balance sheet structure. Banks receive
deposits dt from non entrepreneurs and possibly foreigners, lend lt to ￿rms
a n dh o l da na m o u n to fr e s e r v e sht−1 in the central bank at the beginning
of period t.15 Thus, dt = ht−1 + lt. Deposits in period t yield the risk-free
nominal domestic interest rate it. We assume that banks only take deposits
to cover their lending and reserves needs.16
We assume that banks￿ demand for reserves is linked to the supply of
credit to the manufacturing sector: more speci￿cally, suppose that with prob-
ability λ a manufacturing ￿rm faces an aggregate liquidity shock (e.g., due to
the fact that its workers need to be paid in cash early in the period instead of
waiting until the end of the production period). We assume that the liquidity
14In subsequent periods, where there is no expectational shock and no default, domestic
￿rms will be indiﬀerent between borrowing in domestic or foreign currency.
15Notice the diﬀerence in timing notation between monetary and real-sector variables.
Both ht−1 and lt represent variables determined at the end of t − 1 for period t.T h e
diﬀerence in notation is imposed by the fact that we denote the nominal exchange rate
at the end of period t − 1 as St−1. Then, consistent with the interest paritiy condition,
the nominal interest rate determined at the end of t − 1, but valid for period t,i sit−1.
Consequently, we denote monetary variables determines at the end of t − 1 by the t − 1
subscript, even if they apply for period t.
16We abstract from liquidity needs from depositors so that they are indiﬀerent between
holding bank deposits or domestic bonds. There is also no transactions cost for banks to
receive deposits. Alternatively, banks could also hold bonds and raise more deposits.
13need is proportional to the amount lt borrowed by the ￿rm at the beginning
of the period, γlt. Thus, with each loan lt a bank needs to provide liquidity
γlt to the borrowing ￿rm with probability λ. If the lending bank does not
ful￿l this liquidity need, the ￿rm cannot produce nor repay its outstanding
debt.17
Banks can get liquidity by holding reserve deposits at the central bank
in quantity ht. However, these reserves do not bear interest and thus have
an opportunity cost of it. Alternatively, banks can borrow at the discount
window at a penalty rate e θt. The optimal holdings of reserves by banks in
period t for period (t +1 ) , is determined by the following cost minimization
program in which banks weigh the cost of holding reserves against that of




itht + λ(γlt+1 − ht)e θt
o
.
We assume that this rate increases with the proportion of liquidity which is
borrowed. For analytical convenience, we assume a linear relationship: e θt =
θ • ((γlt+1 − ht)/γlt+1),w h e r eθ is what we call the discount rate and can
be changed by the central bank to modify monetary policy.18 The optimal
demand for reserves is then simply given by:19










If now the central bank supplies a nominal quantity of reserves HS
t ,t h e n






17The liquidity need is assumed constant throughout the analysis. An interesting ex-
tension would be to model this liquidity need and relate it to crises.
18An alternative interpretation of the parameter θ is that it re￿ects a quantity restriction
imposed by the central bank to the commercial banks. For example suppose that the
central bank commits itself to re￿nancing up to a fraction δ of a bank￿s liquidity need
γlt, where δ is uniformly distributed between 0 and D. And let b denote the private loss
incurred by the bank or the bank￿s manager if the liquidity need is not fully met. Then,
the cost minimization problem will be identical to that stated above, but with θ = b
D;
in particular a tighter quantity restriction on re￿nancing, that is a lower D, amounts to
increasing θ.
19See AgØnor, Aizenman, and Hoﬀmaister (2000) for a recent estimation of a similar
demand of reserves by commercial banks in Thailand.
14When changes in monetary policy, that is in either HS
t or θ, are anticipated,
then the equilibrium price Pt will fully adjust to such changes. However,
when changes in monetary policy are unanticipated, the monetary change
will be fully absorbed by the nominal interest rate, which from the above
equation (10), can be expressed as:





Thus the central bank can increase the nominal risk-free interest rate in two
ways: either by decreasing the monetary base HS
t or by increasing the dis-
count window rate θ (or equivalently by tightening its limits to re￿nancing).
3.2 The Cost of Lending
Banks lend to manufacturing ￿r m sa tan o m i n a li n t e r e s tr a t ei∗l
t in foreign
currency units. In general we will need to allow for the possibility of default:
Assume that with probability 1 − qt the bank gets back its full loan plus
interest and with probability qt the ￿rm defaults, in which case the bank
gets a proportion 1 − ϕ of the ￿rm￿s pro￿ts net of wage payments. Its net
expected nominal earnings in domestic currency units, are therefore:






+ qt(1 − ϕ)Pt+1yt+1
Under perfect competition this should be equal to the cost of the loan which
we denote by (1 + ict)Ptlt+1. This cost, in turn, is the sum of the deposit
rate paid by the bank (which, by competition, should be equal to it) and its
intermediation costs. That is
(1 + ict)Ptlt+1 =( 1+it)Ptlt+1 + itPtht + λPt(γlt+1 − ht)e θt.
Using these two equations and letting πt and rt denote the in￿ation rate and


















20Using the fact that the in￿ation rate πt is determined by the following equation, in
which zt denotes the growth rate of reserves supply at date t, which itself follows directly
from (6): 1+πt =( 1+zt)
h(lt,it−1)
h(lt+1,it).


















In particular, in￿ation targeting or any other policy that maintains it con-
stant throughout all periods t ≥ 2, will also result in the lending rate remain-
ing invariant throughout these periods.
Note that the lending rate i∗l
t is in￿uenced both by the risk-free rate it,a n d
therefore indirectly by the supply of reserves Hs
t, and directly by the discount
window rate θ. As we shall see in Section 6 below, tightening the money
supply by increasing θ and by reducing Hs
t, not only have diﬀerent eﬀects
on the overall equilibrium outcome, but also may end up being mutually
oﬀsetting.
3.3 The IPLM Curve
Using the fact that PPP holds at the beginning of every period and in par-
ticular in period 2, so that P2 = Se
2, and thereby eliminating P2 between
the two equations (3) and (11), we obtain the following ￿IPLM￿ relationship








σ (1 − i2
2λθ)
. (8)
For given i2, S1 is a decreasing function of y3.T h i s c a n b e s i m p l y e x -
plained as follows: an anticipated increase in output amounts to an antici-
pated increase in the demand for reserves by the banking system in order to
meet the liquidity needs of the manufacturing sector. This in turn will lead
to an expected appreciation of the domestic currency in the future, that is
to a reduction of Se
2. But the anticipation of a currency appreciation in the
future increases the attractiveness of holding domestic currency bonds to-
day, which in turn induces a reduction in S1, that is a currency appreciation
today.
The negative relationship is illustrated in Figure 1. From the IPLM
equation, we see that a restrictive monetary policy at time 1 shifts the curve
downwards through an increase in i1: for a given future output, a restrictive
monetary policy implies a currency appreciation.
164 The Real Sector
In this section we determine the dynamics of output and provide a graphical
representation between third period output and period one nominal exchange
rate.
4.1 Net Proﬁts and Wealth Dynamics
Let i∗l
t−1 denote the lending rate charged at time t by banks to domestic man-
ufacturing ￿rms which borrow in foreign currency. Using the interest parity
condition to express the debt obligation of ￿rms in units of the domestic
currency, assuming that in case of default a positive fraction ϕ of a ￿rm￿s
output cannot be appropriated by its lenders, 21 and allowing for strategic
default, nominal pro￿ts are:






The second term in the curly bracket is what accrues to the ￿rm in case
of default, under the assumption that entrepreneurs ￿rst pay workers and
then lenders can seize a proportion 1 − ϕ of the remaining funds. Thus,
entrepreneurs are left with ϕαPtyt.22 We shall be particularly interested in
non-deterministic sunspot equilibria where strategic default occurs in period
1, whenever the domestic currency experiences a large depreciation with an
exchange rate realization S00
1 correspondingly high.
>From the optimal savings behavior of entrepreneurs, total net wealth





I fw ef o c u so nap o t e n t i a lc r i s i so c c u r r i n ga tt i m e1, we can look at entrepre-
neurs￿ wealth at time 2:





￿,αϕσ1(1 + ￿)}w1. (10)
21This fraction is naturally interpreted as re￿ecting monitoring imperfections on the
lending side.
22Here we allow for both genuine and strategic default. Genuine default occurs when
the ￿rst term in the curly bracket is negative, while strategic default will occur whenever
the ￿rst term in the curly bracket is less than the second term.
17A currency depreciation clearly has a negative impact on w2 as it increases
the debt burden. Given our assumption that in subsequent periods t ≥ 2,
the productivity parameter σt ≡ σ is suﬃciently large that no expectational
shocks can occur, interest parity will hold throughout these periods and ￿rms
will not ￿nd it pro￿table to default on their debt obligations. Thus, for period
3 we have:






The positive eﬀect of S1 on w3 for given w2, stems from the fact that a
devaluation in period 1 predicts a real appreciation in the following period.
This, in turn, has the eﬀect of lowering the real interest rates on bonds and
investments in period 2, thereby increasing the retained earnings that ￿rms
c a ni n v e s ta tt h eb e g i n n i n go fp e r i o d3 .
For all subsequent periods (t>2)w eh a v e :
wt+1 = β(ασ(1 + ￿) − (1 + i
∗l)￿)wt = βMwt, (12)
where the lending rate i∗l remains also constant throughout these periods
under in￿ation targeting or any other policy that will maintain it constant for
t ≥ 2. This equation shows that output in subsequent periods is unaﬀected
by the nominal exchange rate (a natural consequence of the fact that there
is no deviation from PPP throughout these periods).
4.2 The W curve
Combining (10), (11), and the fact that y3 = σ(1 + ￿)w3, we obtain:
y3 = β











￿,ϕασ1(1 + ￿)}w1. (13)
This gives a second relation between S1 and y3, which we will call the W
curve. It is depicted in Figure 2. We see that it is composed of three segments.
The upper segment is upward sloping and starts at the exchange rate level
b S1, which is the level from which strategic default occurs. Larger values of S1
have only a positive impact on output by lowering the period-two real interest
rate. The second segment is downward sloping. This is the case where a
currency depreciation lowers period-two wealth, which lowers period-three
18wealth and output. When i∗l
1 = i∗l
0 , this segment will be for S1 between P1
and b S1.W h e nS1 is below this point, which is the case where the currency
appreciates compared to its expected level, the curve is upward sloping since
the real interest eﬀect dominates. Notice that without sunspots, the W curve
is vertical. There is an impact of the exchange rate on future output only
when there are deviations from ex post PPP, which in this case only occurs
with sunspots.
The W curve shifts with changes in the real interest rate in period one
i∗l
1 . For example, an increase in i∗l
1 shifts the curve downward, since it implies
a higher cost of debt in period two and thus a lower output.
5 Sunspots Equilibria
In this section, we show under what conditions multiple equilibria occur. We
characterize the set of equilibria (yt+2,S t),t≥ 1,d e ￿ned by the relationships
￿IPLM￿ and ￿W￿ between St and yt+2 for all t. For t ≥ 2, we are taking the
productivity parameter σt = σ to be suﬃciently large that no expectational
equilibrium can occur. The path of policy variables, Ht and it,i sa l s oa s -
sumed given. This, in turn, means that we can solve recursively for a unique
deterministic sunspot equilibrium (yt+2,S t).T h i si sg i v e nb y :











for t ≥ 2,w h e r eM = β(ασ(1 + ￿) − (1 + i∗l)￿).
More interesting is the equilibrium analysis in period 1 where we allow
for extrinsic uncertainty and expectational multiplicity. More speci￿cally,






(1) q = pr(S1 = S00
1) lies strictly between 0 and 1, a n di nf a c tm u s tb e
allowed to be arbitrarily small;




















W : y3 = β












where the ￿rst (resp. second) term in the curly bracket corresponds to the
no-default equilibrium (y0
3,S0
1) (resp. to the default equilibrium (y00
3,S00
1)).
(3) the initial price P1 satis￿es PPP, so that:
P1 = qS
00
1 +( 1− q)S
0
1.
(4) [strategic] default occurs whenever the ￿rm￿s default payoﬀ￿the sec-
ond term in the above curly bracket for y3− is greater than its no-default
payoﬀ￿the ￿rst term in the same bracket. Using the IPLM equation, this is
equivalent to:






￿ ≤ 0 (14)
If we de￿ne a =( 1+i∗l
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1. The equation for R is quadratic, and by solving
it we ￿nd that when q tends to zero, the ratio R becomes approximately equal
to:
R =
α2σ1σ(1 + ￿)2 + ￿2(1 + i∗l
0 )(1 + i∗l
1 ) − ￿(1 + ￿)α
£
σ1(1 + i∗l





ασ(1 + ￿) − (1 + i∗l
1 )￿
¢ .






In particular, ϕ cannot be too large, otherwise b
a < 1, and ￿ cannot be too
small otherwise R<b
a. For example, at ￿ =0 , R =1 /ϕ and b/a goes to
in￿nity. This implies that countries with very low levels of ￿nancial devel-
opment as measured by ￿ and/or ϕ are unlikely to experience expectational
shocks and currency crises. Only those countries at an intermediate level of
￿nancial development, that is where ￿ is not too small (or ϕ is not to large)
but where ￿rms are still credit-constrained, may experience currency crises.
Finally, to the extent that a high value of σ1 (and therefore of b) will also
result in R<b
a, we can indeed rule out expectational shocks in periods t ≥ 2
by assuming that for t ≥ 2, ￿rms￿ productivity σt ≡ σ in all these periods is
suﬃciently high.
6 Policy Analysis
The appropriate monetary policy response to the recent crises has been a
hotly debated question. Our framework, to the extent that it explicitly mod-
els the monetary side of the economy, appears to be well-suited for discussing
these issues. Consider our monetary economy in period 1, and suppose that
the suﬃcient conditions derived in the previous section for expectational
shocks and currency crises to occur in period 1, are met. This implies that
this economy can be described by Figure 3. The IPLM curve intersects the
W curve at three points. Since the intersection in the middle is not a stable
21equilibrium, only the other two intersections are considered. They represent
the crisis equilibrium at (S00
1,y 00
3) and the non-crisis equilibrium at (S0
1,y 0
3).
Can the monetary authorities do anything that would move the IPLM
and/or W curves in such a way that a currency crisis with y = y00
3 and a
correspondingly high nominal exchange rate S = S00
1, c a nb ea v o i d e d ?I nt h e
context of our model, the monetary authorities can use two instruments at
time one to try and stabilize the economy: namely, the supply of reserves
Hs
1 and the discount window parameter θ1.23 Let us rewrite the equations for
the IPLM and the W curve in period 1, namely:24
















W : y3 = β

























Consider ￿rst the eﬀects of a reduction in the supply of reserves Hs in pe-
riod 1. As shown in section 3, this unanticipated monetary change will be fully
absorbed by the nominal risk-free interest rate i1,w h e r e :i1 =2 λθ(1− HS
γP1l1).
Now, to the extent that it increases i1, such a reduction in the monetary
base will shift the IPLM curve downward. For a given W curve, this will
help stabilize the economy, in the sense of getting rid of the multiplicity of
expectational equilibria. However, the W curve also shifts downward when
i∗l
1 increases, and thus when i1 increases. Thus it may not be possible to
avoid a crisis. The reason is that the rise in interest rates may have a signif-
icant negative eﬀect on future output, which puts a downward pressure on
the currency value.
23Future policies, such as Hs
2 and θ2 can also be changed, but the impact of these
changes is left as an exercise to the reader.
24As mentioned above, we take i2 as given. However, we show in Appendix C that
the impact of monetary policy in period one is not signi￿cantly aﬀected by having i2
endogenous.
22Looking at the expression for the lending rate i∗l
1 , we see that the smaller
θ, the less the W curve will shift downward when i1 increases. Thus, a
restrictive open market operation (a reduction in the monetary base) that
increases i1 is less eﬀective with a tight discount window policy.25
This analysis shows that short-term lending facilities and open market
operations have diﬀerent implications, which implies that the central bank
has two instruments for monetary policy. It is then easy to see that the best
strategy to avoid multiple equilibrium is to have a restrictive open market
operation with an expansionary discount policy. This would shift the IPLM
curve to the left and limit the shift in the W curve.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has concentrated on developing a full-￿edged ￿third generation￿
model of currency crises. Whilst we have focused our attention on microfoun-
dations, we have left out a number of interesting implications and extensions
of this type of model. A ￿rst extension is to analyze the post-crisis dynamics
of output. In the simple benchmark case considered in the above graphical
analysis, there is a progressive recovery after a crisis, as ￿rms build up their
net worth. While the recovery is in￿uenced by the policy at the time of the
crisis, it is also in￿uenced by monetary policy in the aftermath of the crisis.
Thus, it would be of interest to examine the dynamics of output under various
policy rules, such as in￿ation, monetary or exchange rate targeting. Longer
lags of price stickiness and issues of credibility could also be introduced in
the analysis.
The precise mechanics of exchange rate policy have also been left out from
the analysis, but in Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001) we show that
assuming a ￿xed exchange rate does not aﬀect the analysis in any substantial
way. If the nominal exchange rate is ￿xed, the central bank has to change its
money supply e.g., through interventions in the foreign exchange market. If
we assume that there is a lower limit to money supply, e.g., through a lower
limit on international reserves as in Krugman (1979), the central bank will
not be able to defend the currency when large shocks occur. Alternatively,
the nominal exchange rate described in this paper can then be reinterpreted
as the ￿shadow￿ exchange rate typically used in the currency crisis literature.
25It is even possible that the W curve shifts more than the IPLM curve for large values
of θ.
23If the shadow exchange rate is depreciated enough, the ￿xed exchange rate
has to be abandoned and a large depreciation occurs. In that case, the
analysis derived from the IPLM-W graph in the above policy section, carries
through: at the ￿good￿ equilibrium the ￿xed exchange rate is sustained, while
at the ￿crisis￿ equilibrium the ￿xed rate is abandoned. While the mechanism
leading to a crisis is similar under a ￿oating or ￿xed exchange rate, there may
be diﬀerences between the two regimes that are not considered in the model.
For example, a ￿xed exchange rate could lead to a stronger real appreciation
which makes more likely that a large depreciation with default can happen.
This result stresses the central role played by corporate balance sheets
and the potentially minor role played by exchange rate policies. Obviously,
a deterioration of public ￿nance can also contribute to a ￿nancial crisis (as
argued in ￿rst and second generation models of currency crises), in partic-
ular through potential crowding-out eﬀects on the balance sheet of private
￿rms. The role of public ￿nance and public debt and its interaction with the
private sector are examined in some detail in Aghion, Bacchetta, and Baner-
jee (2001). In particular, a public debt in foreign currency can increase the
likelihood of a currency crisis as the public sector￿s loss from a devaluation
may increase the interest payment and/or tax burden of ￿rms.
Ac r i t i c a ls i m p l i ￿cation has been to assume a constant credit multiplier ￿.
This assumption simpli￿es the analysis and allows a better exposition of the
main mechanisms at work. However, in a more general framework, the credit
multiplier is in￿uenced by other variables such as the real interest rate (see
Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee, 2001, for a model where ￿ depends nega-
tively on the real interest rate). In this case, output may be more sensitive
to monetary policy and the W curve is more likely to shift downward with
a restrictive monetary policy. Thus, a currency crisis may be more diﬃcult
to avoid. Moreover, we should also try to understand better how the credit
multiplier evolves during crises.
The paper has focused on the foreign currency exposure of ﬁrms,b u t
t h ee x p o s u r eo fbanks is also an important characteristic of recent ￿nancial
crises. In the current setting, banks fully lend in foreign currency, but do not
go bankrupt after a depreciation. An interesting extension of the analysis is
to incorporate explicitly currency exposure at the banking level. If currency
depreciations entail signi￿cant losses for banks, the lending process may be
disrupted (the credit-multiplier ￿ may be reduced) so that ￿rms will again
suﬀer from a currency depreciation. Introducing the possibility of a currency
mismatch at both the bank and the ￿rm levels, can provide new interesting
24insights.
Finally, we have focused attention on currency crises induced by expecta-
tional shocks, that is on the existence of non-degenerate sunspot equilibria.
A natural extension is to introduce exogenous shocks, for example on ￿rms￿
productivity. In particular, a (small) negative shock on productivity may
have substantial eﬀects on output and the nominal exchange rate if ￿rms
are highly indebted in foreign currency, to the extent that such a shock may
result in the IPLM and W curves intersecting more than once.
8 Appendix A: Entrepreneurs’ savings deci-
sions






s.t. ce,j = Mjwj − wj+1









Assuming that the solution is of the form
ce,t = ξMtwt (18)











which in turn yields:
wt+1 = βMtwt
Since ce,t = Mtwt − wt+1,t h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t h( 1 8 )w h e nξ =1− β.
259 Appendix B: Foreign versus Domestic Cur-
rency Borrowing
This Appendix shows that when the currency composition of debt cannot
be observed, there exist conditions under which it is weakly optimal for a
domestic ￿rm to borrow entirely in foreign currency from a single borrower.
The argument is directly adapted from Chamon (2001)￿we simply generalize
his result to allow the ￿rms to be credit constrainted.
Consider an initial situation where there is extrinsic uncertainty on the
nominal exchange rate of the type described in Section 3, with the nominal
exchange rate, St+1, being either low (S0
t+1 with probability 1−q) or very high
(S00
t+1 with small probability q). The key assumption is that the exchange
rate depreciation, when it happens, is large enough that a manufacturing
￿rm that borrows in foreign currency but prices in domestic currency, will
prefer to default on the loan, that is:




t+1wt￿t > ϕPt+1σwt(1 + ￿t) (19)




t+1wt￿t < ϕPt+1σwt(1 + ￿t). (20)
Here i∗l
t is the equilibrium foreign currency interest rate, which must satisfy
the zero pro￿tc o n d i t i o n . 26
(1 − q)(1 + i∗l
t )S0
t+1wt￿t + q(1 − ϕ)Pt+1σwt(1 + ￿t)
Pt
=( 1+ict)wt￿t, (21)
where ict is the lending cost at date t.
We are interested in whether, given these expectations about the ex-
change rate, it can be optimal for a ￿rm to borrow in foreign currency. It is
obvious that in this scenario the socially eﬃcient outcome has the ￿rm bor-
rowing only in the domestic currency and thereby being fully insured against
the exchange rate risk (the lenders who are risk neutral should insure the
￿rm which has log-preferences and therefore is risk averse). However, it will
turn out that because of the unobservability of the currency composition of
debt, borrowing exclusively in the domestic currency is not necessarily an
equilibrium outcome.
Let us reason by contradiction and assume that borrowing entirely in do-
mestic currency is an equilibrium. More speci￿cally, consider a domestic ￿rm
26The implicit assumption here and throughout the paper is that investors are fully
diversi￿ed and therefore risk-neutral.
26that has contracted a domestic currency loan of Ptwt￿t invested in produc-
tion. If it sticks to that loan and does not borrow from any other lender, the
￿rm can expect domestic currency earnings of Pt+1yt+1 = Pt+1σwt(1 + ￿t)
and it faces an expected debt repayment obligation of Pt(1+ict)￿twt = LD
t+1
in domestic currency. However, as in Chamon (2001), the ￿rm may actu-
ally contemplate a deviation from this one-domestic-loan strategy and bor-
row again, this time in foreign currency. Suppose it borrows an additional
amount B in foreign currency and uses it to buy BSt units of domestic cur-
rency government debt (which pays an interest rate it) that it then pledges
to the second lender. As already mentioned in a previous section, the fact
that the loan is secured by a pledgeable asset means that there is no limit to
the amount that can be borrowed: B can be as large as the borrower wants it
to be. Moreover, since this loan is not a production loan it does not generate
any demand for liquidity. So the cost of the second loan is just it.
Note that since this second loan is repayable in foreign currency but is
invested in domestic currency bonds, taking this route exposes the ￿rm to
exchange rate risk but the ￿rm￿s expected earnings are unchanged. In partic-
ular, it is easily checked that the ￿rm loses money in state S00
t+1 by taking this
route and makes money in state S0
t+1.F o rB small it will nevertheless be able
to repay both loans in both states of the world. Therefore, a small increase
in B starting from zero makes the ￿rm worse oﬀ￿ i th a st h es a m ee x p e c t e d
earnings but more risk. Therefore it cannot be optimal to ever choose B in
this range.
Consider however what happens when the chosen value of B is so large
that the ￿rm has to default in state S00
t+1. In this case the interest rate on
this second loan (once again assuming zero pro￿t in lending), e il
t, will have to
satisfy:








t+1 − BSt(1 + it)
B(1 +e il
t)S00








t+1 =( 1− ϕ)σwt(1 + ￿t)Pt+1.
This follows from the fact that in case of default, the second lender keeps the
asset that is pledged to him, and in addition, gets a share of the part of the
borrower￿s production output that has not been diverted. The share each
27lender gets is in turn proportional to the net ￿rm￿s repayment obligation











t+1 − BSt(1 + it)
B(1 +e il
t)S00





The latter equation shows clearly that as B goes up the second lender￿s share
of the production revenue D00
t+1 goes up, and therefore the lower is e il
t. Since
t h ei n c r e a s ei nB being mooted is a deviation from a putative equilibrium,
the ￿rst lender cannot observe the change in B, and therefore this increase
in B must leave the interest rate charged by the ￿rst lender unchanged.
Therefore, once B is so large that default in state S00
t+1 is inevitable, any
further increase in B makes the borrower better oﬀ. Given that the borrower
can borrow as much as he wants (this is where the fact that the second loan
is secured matters), his optimal choice, conditional on choosing B>0, is to
choose B as large as possible. It is easily checked that when B becomes very






(1 − ϕ)σwt(1 + ￿t)Pt+1.
The borrower￿s utility if he deviates from this option will be:
U











)+q ln(ϕσwt(1 + ￿t))






(1 − ϕ)σwt(1 + ￿t))
+qln(ϕσwt(1 + ￿t)).
In writing the last expression we make use of the fact that il
t is equal to
ict, which in turn follows from the fact that we started by assuming that
borrowing entirely in domestic currency, with domestic loans being conse-
quently riskless, was an equilibrium. The question of whether there is an
equilibrium with only domestic currency borrowing therefore boils down to
how the expression above compares with the utility from just borrowing in
domestic currency, namely:




28While the expected income generated by the above multiple loans strategy
is higher than that generated by a single domestic currency loan, the risk
is also higher. Now, one can verify that for ϕ suﬃciently large but not so
large as making default occur in all states of nature, e.g., for ϕ less than but




Pt+1σ(1+￿) ),U 1 will be greater than U, so that borrowing only
in domestic currency will not be an equilibrium.
The ￿nal step in the argument is to note that in any equilibrium where
the domestic ￿rm borrows ￿rst in domestic currency and then chooses B to
be arbitrarily large, its expected utility becomes approximately equal to:
U








(1 − ϕ)σwt(1 + ￿t))
+qln(ϕσwt(1 + ￿t))








(1 − ϕ)σwt(1 + ￿t))
+qln(ϕσwt(1 + ￿t))
The last step uses the fact that in this equilibrium the ￿rst lender only expects
to be paid in state S0
t+1 and therefore 1+il
t = 1+ict
1−q .
Had the borrower borrowed instead entirely in the foreign currency, the
borrower￿s expected utility would be:
U













t+1 + q(1 − ϕ)Pt+1σwt(1 + ￿t),
so that:
U








(1 − ϕ)σwt(1 + ￿t))
+qln(ϕσwt(1 + ￿t))
But this is exactly the expression for U2. In other words, the borrower does
just as well by borrowing entirely from a single lender in the foreign currency.
Therefore borrowing entirely in foreign currency is an equilibrium whenever
U<U 1.
2910 Appendix C: Endogenous Future Interest
Rates
Here we show that the impact of monetary policy in period 1 is not aﬀected
by the future path of monetary policy (assuming it is credible). In the main
text, it is assumed that the central bank stabilizes i2. If the monetary au-
thority targets money growth, the second-period interest rate will depend
on the entire dynamics of money supply. Let zt be the growth rate of the
monetary base, such that HS
t =( 1+zt)HS
t−1. To see what happens when
i2 is endogenized, we analyze a simple extension of the basic model where
we set z3 and let i2 vary endogenously, but still keeping it ￿xed for t ≥ 3.
The reasoning can then be extended for any number of period, as long as the
nominal interest rate is stabilized at some date before in￿nity.
The second-period interest rate is now determined by the equation: 1+
i2 =( 1+i∗)(1+π3), which is derived from the interest rate parity condition
1+i2 =( 1+i∗)S3/S2, using the fact that PPP holds after the ￿rst period.






and i3 is determined by the equation 1+i3 =( 1 +i∗)(1+π4). These equations
jointly determine i2 and π3 as functions of z3 for given values of y3, y4,a n d
π4.
Note that i2 depends on π3 which in turn depends on y3 and y4. From
(12) we see that i1 h a sn od i r e c ti m p a c to ny4 (for any ￿xed value of y3).
Thus, changing i1 keeping y3 ￿xed, leaves π3 and therefore i2 unaﬀected.
This implies that movements in the IPLM curve are not aﬀected by the
endogeneity of i2.
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